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The purpose of this article is to offer a practical approach to the new European 
dimension for regional parliaments signified by the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon. The parliamentary scrutiny of subsidiarity by way of the early warning system has 
assigned a new mission to legislative assemblies with the aim of reinforcing the 
intervention of regions in the drafting of policies by Union institutions. In the Spanish 
case, the institutionalisation of this mechanism came about with Act nº 24/2009, which 
attributes to the Joint Committee for the European Union, in the name of the Cortes 
Generales [the Spanish Parliament], the function of receiving the proposals for legislative 
acts by the EU and transferring them to the regional parliaments in order for the latter to 
issue, in a brief period of four weeks, a report on compliance with the principle of 
subsidiarity. The majority of regional parliaments have also carried out normative reforms 
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The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, along with the process of reforms of 
regional statutes which commenced in Spain in 2006, has given rise to a political scenario in 
which the Autonomous Communities and their regional parliaments acquire, at least 
normatively, a greater role in the scrutiny of the principle of subsidiarity by way of the early 
warning mechanism. This new regulation seeks to provide a response, in part, to the so-
called “democratic deficit of the European Union,” a demand which has been shown to be 
associated with “multilevel governance” (Beltrán 2010: 24-28).  
The regulation on subsidiarity and proportionality in Protocol number 2 provides for 
possibilities of participation by regions in different phases of the legislative procedure and 
with different degrees of intensity. In this way, it attempts to commit three levels of 
legislative bodies (European, national and regional parliaments), although, as has been 
pointed out, in reality it affects four competence levels (European, state, regional and 
local), but in different ways (Fernández Allés, 2011: 4-5).  
Articles 5 and 12 of Protocol 2 specify the procedures whereby national parliaments 
carry out the scrutiny of the application of the principle of subsidiarity and allow, even if 
only in an embryonic manner, the participation in this process of regional parliaments with 
legislative powers. This procedure is executed by means of the early warning system. The 
scope of application of this mechanism only affects drafts of legislative acts, and the period 
in which the intervention of national parliaments must take place is eight weeksI.  
The possibility the Protocol offers to the intervention of regional parliaments with 
legislative powers in the scrutiny of subsidiarity is rather limited and remains in the hands 
of the EU Member States. Thus, Article 6 of Protocol 2 establishes that “It will be for each 
national parliament or each chamber of a national parliament to consult, where appropriate, regional 
parliaments with legislative powers.” Their intervention occurs only to the extent that it is 
contemplated in the internal legal system; in such a manner that the presence of regional 
parliaments is subject to the national parliament deeming it pertinent; and the Commission 
assumes that when a national parliament expresses its opinion this also reflects the opinion 
of the regional parliaments of that Member State (Martín y Pérez de Nanclares, 2008: 58). 
Each national parliament has adopted its own internal regulations, generating a 
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heterogeneity that is only explained by the diversity of political, legal, social and cultural 
factors that inspire each parliamentary institution. In this way, the appropriateness of the 
consultation of regional parliaments, which seemed imperative (Alonso de León, 2011: 
302) especially in those cases in which the competences of the regions were affected 
(Palomares Amat, 2011: 26), has been the option adopted by the eight Member States of 
the Union with regional legislative parliaments (Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom), where all the drafts, with no prior filter, are 
referred to the regional assemblies (Vara Arribas, 2011: 26). However, although the 
parliaments of these countries send all draft legislative acts to their regional parliaments, the 
latter only emit reasoned opinions which are not binding, nor do they oblige the competent 
State body to justify its decision when it deviates from the standard set out in the same 
aspect –a fact which undermines the very purpose of the procedure (Martín y Pérez de 
Nanclares 2010: 84). 
 
2. The early warning system in Spain 
 
The first studies on the scrutiny of the principle of subsidiarity by the Cortes Generales 
[Spanish Parliament] were conducted during the 8th legislature (2004-2008). The Joint 
Committee for the European Union formed a Working Group on the early warning 
system, which drew up a report on the application, by the Cortes Generales, of the 
Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality which 
accompanies the Lisbon TreatyII. In the following legislature, the Joint Committee for the 
European Union drafted a study paper on the effects of the Lisbon Treaty on the Cortes 
Generales, incorporating the recommendations of the previous report and approving a text 
to adapt Act nº 8/1994 of 19 May regulating the Joint Committee for the European 
UnionIII. Following the pertinent processing by the urgent procedure and in a single 
reading, Act nº 24/2009 of 22 December was passed, modifying Act nº 8/1994 of 19 May 
and institutionalising both the early warning system and the participation of regional 
parliaments in the scrutiny procedure of the principle of subsidiarity by establishing the 
periods, form and effects thereof. 
The Act attributes to the Joint Committee for the European UnionIV the power to 
issue, in the name of the Cortes Generales, a reasoned opinion on the infringement of the 
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principle of subsidiarity (Article 3j), without prejudice to the power of the Plenary Sessions 
of the Congress and the Senate to table a debate and a vote on the opinion expressed by 
the Committee in the terms laid down in the regulations of the respective chambers 
(Article 5). The maximum period provided for the approval of the opinion by the Joint 
Committee or, as the case may be, by the Plenary Sessions of the Chambers, is eight weeks 
from the reception of the draft of the legislative act by the Cortes Generales. In this way, 
the Spanish legislator opted to establish a joint procedure of approval of reasoned 
opinions. The Protocol attributes this power to each chamber of the national parliaments, 
but it does not prevent joint action, especially by way of the Joint CommitteeV. 
This Committee has the appropriate guarantees for the participation of the national 
parliaments in the preparation of the legislation of the European Union: all the 
parliamentary groups are represented; its joint character facilitates coordination between 
the two chambers, and in spite of not being a legislative committee but a permanent one, it 
is more than a mere instrument of parliamentary control. The Committee meets 
periodically – at least twice a month during the sessions– to monitor the action of the 
Government in European matters, and to this purpose the Act enlarges the list of 
competences of said Joint Committee, incorporating those conferred to national 
parliaments by the Lisbon TreatyVI. 
The second innovation contained in Act nº 24/2009 is the possibility provided for also 
in the Protocol that national parliaments can consult regional parliaments with legislative 
powers. This possibility is here articulated in a general manner, by way of the referral to the 
parliaments of Autonomous Communities of all European legislative initiatives, as soon as 
they are received and without prejudging the existence of affects on regional competences 
(Article 6). Regional parliaments have a period of four weeks from the sending of the 
European legislative initiative by the Cortes Generales to issue and send their reasoned 
opinion to the Joint Committee. If this Committee approves a reasoned opinion on the 
infringement of the principle of subsidiarity by a draft of a legislative act of the European 
Union, it must incorporate the list of opinions submitted by the regional parliaments and 
the necessary references for consulting them. However, as we will see next, this imposition 
is only formal and does not incorporate an obligation to justify why the Committee is 
diverging from the criterion established in the opinion of regional parliament.  
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The 2009 Act therefore regulates two phases of the procedure of the scrutiny of 
subsidiarity: a state (Article 5) and an autonomous region phase (Article 6). 
 
2.1. State phase 
The scrutiny procedure to be followed by the Cortes Generales in the application of 
the principle of subsidiarity for drafts of EU legislative acts required the reform of the 
Resolution of the Committees of the Congress and the Senate of 21 September 1995, by 
way of a Resolution, and likewise of the Committees of the Congress and the Senate, of 27 
May 2010. The need to conduct the procedure within the chambers, and the internal 
organisational measures for its execution, required this adaptation to align the role of the 
Joint Committee with the provisions of the new Lisbon Treaty, and in particular Protocol 2 
(Carbajal and Delgado, 2010: 18-24). 
These modifications attribute to the Committee and the spokespersons of the Joint 
Committee for the European Union the task of permanent monitoring of European 
legislative initiatives by way of decisions adopted by a weighted vote of the members of 
each parliamentary group in the Joint Committee. The Committee and the spokespersons 
must carry out a preliminary examination of the drafts of legislative acts forwarded by the 
institutions of the Union, and may agree to simply acknowledge receipt of an initiative or 
commence the procedure for drafting a report or a reasoned opinion by designating as its 
deponent a member of the Congress or Senate who is also a member of the Committee, 
who will then be in charge of drawing up a proposal, to which alternative proposals or 
amendments may be submitted, along with requests for final approval by the Plenary 
Sessions of the Chambers. There also exists the possibility to request from the State 
Government a report on the degree of compliance of the legislative act with the principle 
of subsidiarity, within a maximum period of two weeks, accompanied by any official 
documents of EU bodies which may have been used in the drafting of that legislative act 
and which are in the Government’s power. The short period available makes it reasonable 
to consider that, in general, the competence for drafting a reasoned opinion is attributed to 
the Joint Committee, but this measure is complemented by the possibility of a number of 
Members of Parliament to request both a debate and a vote in the Plenary Session of the 
respective Chamber. 
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The initiative for drafting reasoned opinions is attributed to the Committee and the 
Spokespersons of the Joint Committee for the European Union, to two parliamentary 
groups or to one-fifth of the members of the Joint Committee, within the period of four 
weeks from reception of the initiative. If the initiative originates from the Committee and 
Spokespersons of the Committee, a Working Group is designated to draft a proposal for 
the reasoned opinion. In all other cases, the initiative must be accompanied by a proposal 
of the reasoned opinionVII.  
If the Joint Committee approves a reasoned opinion on the infringement of the 
principle of subsidiarity, Article 6.3 of the Act requires the incorporation of the list of 
opinions forwarded by regional parliaments and the necessary references for consulting 
them. In practice, the published reports and reasoned opinions incorporate only a brief 
mention of the regional legislative assemblies that have replied to the consultation and the 
general substance of their replies, without however specifying anything more (Rubio de 
Val, 2012: 89). 
Between the inception of the system (May 2011) and the dissolution of the 
9thLegislature of the Spanish Parliament (September 2011), the Joint Committee sent 130 
legislative drafts to the regional parliaments, with a balance of 39 reports of compliance 
and two reasoned opinions, the rest simply being acknowledgments of receipt (Camisón 
Yagüe, 2012: 39). In the current legislature, between the constitution of the Joint 
Committee (February 2012) and October 2012, 67 consultations have been undertaken, 
including 11 reports of compliance and six reasoned opinions. 
 
2.2. Regional phase 
The 2009 Act stipulated the duty of referring a European legislative initiative to the 
regional parliaments without prejudging the existence of affected regional competences, in 
order for those parliaments to be able to submit to the Cortes Generales a reasoned 
opinion on the application of the principle of subsidiarity. The procedure followed is 
established in the Agreement of the Joint Committee for the European Union of 24 March 
2009VIII, which lays down that as soon as the European legislative initiative is received by 
the Cortes Generales, the Secretary of the Joint Committee forwards it via e-mail to the 
parliaments of the Autonomous Communities, thereby starting the period of four weeks 
for drafting proposals of reasoned opinions. 
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Subsequently, Act nº 38/2010 of 20 December again modified Act nº 8/1994 with the 
aim of reinforcing the functions assigned to the Joint Committee. This reform incorporates 
a new Chapter III, which regulates the periodical appearances of the Government – 
ministers and high officials – before the Joint Committee prior to the holding of a meeting 
of the Council of the European Union, and a singular Chapter IV (also new) which 
establishes the participation by and appearance of the autonomous governments before the 
Committee.  
The collective of subjects who can participate is extended to all the members of 
autonomous governments, and participation is articulated to report on the impact of the 
regulations of European Union institutions and the drafts of legislative acts and other 
documents issued by EU institutions on matters in which they hold some form of 
competence. The singularity lies in the fact of providing, in parallel to the participation 
mechanism of regional parliaments in the early warning system, for another participation 
mechanism, which articulates a new system of relations, not merely inter-parliamentary but 
rather between the State Parliament – the Joint Committee – and the autonomous 
governments. In this way, participation in the process of scrutiny of subsidiarity is opened 
up to regional executives, a possibility not contemplated in Protocol 2.  
The risk that the participation by autonomous executives distorts the parliamentary 
nature of the scrutiny of the principle of subsidiarity, relegating to a lower plane the 
opinion issued by the autonomous parliament itself or even generating conflicts due to the 
maintenance of differing positions (Rubio de Val, 2012: 89), has led to the consideration 
that this procedure is contrary to the spirit of the system established in the Protocol, which 
had been designed to mitigate the democratic deficit through the intervention of 
representative bodies of citizens (Alonso de León, 2011: 322). 
 
 
3. Regional participation in the early warning system 
 
New parliamentary functions which are configured by the principle of subsidiarity are 
also provided for at the regional level. Thus, some Autonomous Communities have 
included references to the participation of their parliaments in the analysis of compliance 
with subsidiarity in the articles of their Statutes, as a consequence of the reforms of their 
statutes undertaken from the year 2006 onwards. Catalonia for example established, in 
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Article 188 of its EAC, that its Parliament participates in the scrutiny procedures of the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality established by EU legislation in relation to 
European legislative proposals when they affect competences (not interest) of the 
GeneralitatIX.  
Other Autonomous Communities also incorporated into their Statutes competences of 
their Parliament relating to the scrutiny of subsidiarity: the Valencian Community (Article 
61.3.a), Andalusia (Article 237), the Balearic Islands (Article 112, although the wording of 
the precept appears to imply a facultative nature), Aragon (Article 93.3), Castile-Leon 
(Article 62.2) and Navarre (Article 68.6). In the case of Extremadura, it only includes a 
generic reference to the State’s duty of consultation, but not referring specifically to the 
principle of subsidiarity (Article 70a).  
 
3.1. Affects on competences as a selective criterion for modulating regional 
participation 
As laid down in Act nº 24/2009, the Joint Committee refers to the regional 
parliaments, as soon as it receives them, any drafts of European legislative acts “without 
prejudging the existence of affected autonomous competences.” This automatism provided 
for in the Act entails an indiscriminate sending of documentation to the regional 
parliaments, and therefore some type of modulation or selective criterion must be activated 
in view of the short time the regional parliaments have for drafting their opinions, if 
applicable. This filter is articulated by each autonomous parliament on the basis of the 
principle of whether or not its competences are affected. This is laid down in the Statutes 
of Catalonia, Castile-Leon and Aragon, which limit the participation of their regional 
parliament to the existence of affected competences. Scrutiny only makes sense if it refers 
to matters for which an Autonomous Community has regulatory powers. This question is a 
preliminary activity, and only if the reply is positive should the early warning procedure be 
set in motion. Although the function of the Joint Committee is to automatically forward 
any legislative initiative, the action of the autonomous legislative assembly must going the 
contrary direction, i.e. to refuse to perform a scrutiny procedure on initiatives which do not 
fall within its scope of competences or which represent no political interest or have no 
impact on its competences.  
However, this has not been the practice followed by the different regional parliaments 
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and only some of them have opted to select topics.  
Such is the case of the Catalan Parliament. Until the end of the 8thLegislature (2006-
2010), the Parliament always issued a reasoned opinion on a consultation made. In the 
previous short legislature (2010-2012) and in the present one it is selecting particularly 
matters that are of most interest for it, and reports on them. On the rest, it may agree to 
conclude the procedure with am ere acknowledgement of receipt if the Committee of the 
Permanent Delegation or the competent Committee consider that there are no significant 
doubts concerning the requisite compliance with the principle of subsidiarity (Palomares 
Amat, 2011: 19-20)X.  
This filter operating in the regional parliaments makes it possible to rationalise the 
system, and grants them a proper and differentiated role from the function that has been 
assumed by the Cortes Generales. But perhaps, in order for these regional parliaments to 
preserve and perform effectively the scrutiny function assigned to them, the Joint 
Committee could be required to send them “the annual legislative programme, along with 
any other instrument of legislative programming or political strategy” which the 
Commission sends to it, in accordance with the provisions of Article 1 of Protocol 1. And 
the fact is that prior knowledge of an initiative – in a pre-legislative phase – would allow for 
greater coherence of the early warning system itself. 
Once this filter has been passed, the next step is to analyse to what extent the 
European legislative draft received complies with the principle of subsidiarity. This 
principle, as has been said, has a political dimension of a subjective nature (Albertí et al. 
2005: 16-17), which requires a value judgment that enters into the realm of appreciation 
(Arce Janáriz, 2010: 80). It is not a question of determining whether the European Union 
has legal powers in that ambit, but of making a political appraisal of the necessity of a 
measure. In this respect, I think the early warning mechanism cannot be seen as a route for 
claiming the relevant power in the internal sphere (State – Autonomous Community), but 
for determining whether the requirements that accompany the principle of subsidiarity are 
fulfilled or not (Pons et al. 2012: 206). 
In addition, the briefness of the periods of the early warning procedure also entails 
determining the capacity of action of an autonomous parliament. I think that if the 
principle of subsidiarity is respected, there is no sense in drafting an opinion. Only in the 
event that its evaluation is negative does it make sense to issue an opinion. That is to say, 
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the reasoned opinion of a regional parliament is justified when an infringement of the 
requirements of the principle of subsidiarity is detected which affects the competences of 
the respective Autonomous Community. In another respect, if the Joint Committee 
considers that the principle of subsidiarity is not affected, it should justify why it is 
diverging from the opinion of one or several regional parliaments.  
However, this is not the solution adopted by Act nº 24/2009, which establishes the 
early warning system not as a mechanism of participation by regional parliaments but as a 
mechanism of information on drafts of legislative acts in process, since the will of the 
autonomous parliament is mediatised and subordinated to a decision of the State 
Parliament (Martín y Pérez de Nanclares, 2010: 84 and De Castro Ruano, 2012: 101). That 
is to say, the opinions issued by regional parliaments may or may not be taken into account 
by the Joint Committee, but the latter is not obliged to justify a decision not to consider 
those opinions. 
 
3.2. Regulation of the early warning system by the various regional parliaments 
The majority of regional parliaments (whether they have reformed their statutes or not) 
have carried out a series of reforms of their parliamentary rules to adapt to their 
participation in the scrutiny of the principle of subsidiarity in legislative proposals of the 
EU.  
In the great majority of cases, these reforms have been carried out by way of 
resolutions of the Presidency, which are more flexible than Parliamentary RegulationsXI. 
This has been the option chosen by the Parliaments of Cantabria, Andalusia, Castile-Leon, 
Castile-La Mancha, La Rioja, Madrid, Asturias, and Galicia. The latter also provides for the 
application of these rules in the Subsidiarity Monitoring Network of the Committee of the 
RegionsXII. The case of the Parliament of the Basque Country is unusual: the regulation on 
the early warning system was established firstly by a Resolution of the Presidency and was 
then incorporated as an annex to a subsequent reform of the Regulations of Parliament 
(Castro Ruano, 2012: 93-111 and González Pascual, 2012: 37-64). In the Parliament of 
Navarre something similar occurred: first a Resolution of the Presidency was passed, then 
incorporation into the Regulations of Parliament, as Article 64.  
Other regional parliaments have not adopted any type of resolution which would 
specify the early warning system, but some brief references are nevertheless found in the 
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respective parliamentary regulations. This is the case of the Valencian Community (Article 
181 of the Regulations of the Cortes), the Canary Islands (Article 48 of the Regulations) 
and Extremadura (Article 102 of the Regulations). 
Finally, we find a third option in this comparative analysis: the absence of a regulation 
in the parliamentary rules on the participation of the regional parliament in the scrutiny 
procedure of the principle of subsidiarity, a situation which, however, has not prevented 
the fostering of an active participation of the parliament in the matter – in fact, rather the 
opposite has occurred. The case of Aragon is especially striking. Its Cortes preferred the 
regulation to be decreed in a more flexible rule, such as the aforesaid option of a 
Presidency Resolution. For this reason, and at the same time as the Parliament was 
participating in the pilot test, a Draft Resolution was drawn up, but it was then decided to 
wait to accumulate a certain degree of experience in the procedure in order to be more 
familiar with the regulation and to be able to execute it in better conditions, to the point 
that, to our knowledge, Aragon still does not have any legislation regulating this question. 
However, the Cortes de Aragón remain one of the most active parliaments in the scrutiny 
procedure of the principle of subsidiarity. 
 
3.3. Internal mechanisms of operation and competent parliamentary bodies for 
substantiating the early warning system 
The possibility offered by Protocol 2 of the Lisbon Treaty was considered by most 
regional parliaments to be a new avenue of parliamentary work which generated 
considerable interest due to its innovative nature (Carmona Contreras, 2012: 143), but it 
has necessitated a style of work marked by speed – because all the processing and the work 
of the parliamentary groups is concentrated into just four weeks – and the insufficiency of 
resources and personnel to comply with it. As we will see, this has caused some regional 
regulations to prefer to obviate the possible action of the Plenary Session in the phase of 
approval of the opinion. 
The internal functioning is as follows. The Joint Committee for the European Union 
sends, via e-mail, a note with the draft of the legislative act and complementary 
documentation which is accompanied by the subsidiarity sheet (evaluation of impact) 
drawn up by the European Commission, which necessarily accompanies all the drafts 
passed by this body. The contents of the sheet are set out in the Protocol and refer to the 
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following elements: analysis of the subject-matter, legal basis in the Treaty, the 
(autonomous) competence affected, and whether or not it affects the principle of 
subsidiarity (Camisón Yagüe, 2012: 39)XIII.  
There is no uniformity at the level of regional regulation in regard to the body in charge 
of drafting the opinion in each autonomous parliament. Some parliaments have delegated 
this function to a specialised Foreign Affairs Committee (this is the case of Andalusia, 
Castile-Leon, Castile-La Mancha, Madrid, Galicia, Canary Islands, Extremadura, and 
Balearic Islands), while others delegate it to materially competent sectoral committees 
(Cantabria, Basque Country, La Rioja, and the Valencian Community). Both in the 
Principality of Asturias and in Navarre, the function is assigned to a specialised Foreign 
Affairs Board (Permanent Early Warning Board in Asturias), composed of one 
representative from each parliamentary group. In Aragon the power is assigned to the 
Foreign Affairs Board, constituted with a permanent nature within the framework of the 
Institutional Committee on Statutory Development. The rationale given for attributing the 
function to this body is the thematic specialisation of its members and the desire not to 
deadlock the activity of the Foreign Affairs Committee if it were to be assigned all the EU 
initiatives for the verification of compliance with the principle of subsidiarity (Rubio de 
Val, 2012: 90-92). In another respect, the transversal character of many of the EU’s 
legislative drafts, along with the lack of correspondence on many occasions between the 
EU’s material scopes and the nature of parliamentary committees, justifies the attribution 
of that function to the specific Committee (Palomares Amat, 2011: 33-34).  
Concerning the diversity of regulations, we can observe that some opt for a model of 
“concentrated scrutiny” (study and decision are concentrated in a single, specialised body) 
and others for a model of “diffused scrutiny” (participation by all the sectoral committees 
involved by the nature of the issue).  
Some parliamentary regulations also contemplate the possibility of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee operating outside the ordinary sessions period by way of extraordinary sessions 
necessary for this purpose (this is the case of Castile-Leon and Castile-La Mancha). Others 
establish that EU legislative drafts enjoy preferential processing over the rest of the 
Committee’s tasks (Andalusia, Castile-Leon, Castile-La Mancha, and Galicia), and some 
even eliminate the admission procedure by the Bureau of the Chamber (Andalusia, Castile-
La Mancha, and Galicia). The power of this Bureau to agree that the opinion be submitted 
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to debate and approval by the Plenary Session is expressly provided for in four regulations: 
Cantabria, Canary Islands, Extremadura and Catalonia; and, in the case of Valencia and the 
Canary Islands, only if this is expressly agreed by the Bureau. The other communities do 
not have any provision in this respect. 
 
3.4. Cooperation with autonomous governments 
One absolutely essential requirement for the Members of Parliament to perform their 
scrutiny task correctly is that they have the information and opinion of their own 
autonomous government. If scrutiny of subsidiarity is fundamentally a political control, 
knowing the opinion of the autonomous executive on the compliance with or infringement 
by a European legislative draft provides not only indispensable information for MPs to 
carry out their task, but also allows the role corresponding to regional parliaments in the 
scrutiny of subsidiarity to be situated appropriately within the political terrain (Carmona 
Contreras, 2012: 145). Moreover, the involvement of the autonomous government enables 
all the necessary technical means to be placed at the parliament’s disposal.  
From this analysis of the very diverse regional regulations, it is seen that some 
parliaments generally request that kind of information from their autonomous government 
(Andalusia, Cantabria, the Basque Country, Castile-Leon, Castile-La Mancha, Madrid, 
Asturias, Galicia, Navarre and La Rioja). In this latter case, an element of flexibility is 
added: if the government’s opinion is that the legislative draft complies with the principle 
of subsidiarity and the autonomous competences and no observation has been made by 
any parliamentary group, the procedure is concluded without the need to call the 
competent committee. The Resolution of the Government of the Principality of Asturias 
also provides for the possibility of shelving the proceeding when no opinion is issued: in 
this case the term “expiry” is used specifically. In Navarre, the Foreign Affairs Board has 
the power of requiring the appearance of experts in the matter and can forward the 
legislative draft to the Government of Navarre to report on it. In the case of the Canary 
Islands, there is no provision for the legislative draft to be sent to the autonomous 
government: it is only established that the specialised Committee may request the presence 
of a member of the Government to express its position. In other cases, the cooperation 
between parliament and government is not systematic but possible (Murcia and Catalonia); 
in others, it is simply not applied, as is the case of Aragon. The government can be asked 
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to express its opinion on the impact on autonomous competences and the appearance of 
authorities and officials who are competent in the matter covered by the legislative draft 
can be requested, but neither of these two possibilities has been used to date.  
 
3.5. Cooperation of autonomous governments with the Cortes Generales 
Act nº 38/2010 also provides for the possibility of participation by the autonomous 
governments in the Joint Committee of the Cortes Generales. This Act introduces a 
Chapter IV on the appearance of the autonomous governments before the Joint 
Committee for the European Union, by way of which the President or any other member 
of the Government may request their appearance in order to report on the impact of the 
regulations of the European Union institutions and the draft legislative acts and other 
documents issued by European Union institutions which have been forwarded to them in 
order to scrutinise the degree of compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. 
This guarantees that the position not only of the autonomous parliament will be heard, 
as provided for in the Protocol, but also that of the autonomous government, articulating 
an additional possibility for the performance of this scrutiny, although always subordinated 
to the will of the Joint Committee. This places the emphasis once again on the 
governmental, but not parliamentary, intervention of Autonomous Communities in matters 
relating to the EU.  
As we commented earlier, this represents articulating, along with the mechanism of 
participation by regional parliaments, a new system of relationships between the State 
Parliament – the Joint Committee – and autonomous governments. This appears to 
constitute an additional guarantee for the protection of regional interests, allowing for a 
second voice to be heard – but this faculty, not provided for in the Protocol on the 
application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, is contrary to the spirit of 
that system, which is to facilitate the intervention in the decision-making procedure in the 
European Union of representative bodies of citizens. The obvious risk is that autonomous 
governments, often with more resources and greater political initiative, will eclipse the 
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4. The early warning mechanism in the Parliament of  Catalonia 
 
The provision for the participation of the Catalan Parliament in the scrutiny procedure 
of the principle of subsidiarity, and in particular in the early warning mechanism, is 
regulated very briefly in Article 181 of the Regulations of the Parliament of Catalonia. 
Palomares Amat (2011: 14) has pointed out that the procedure established by the 
Regulations was designed “for any consultations which may be formulated, directly, by the 
institutions of the Union, and specifically the European Parliament, to the Parliament of 
Catalonia,” but it must be recalled that the reform of the Regulations of the Parliament 
date from the year 2005, that is prior to the passing of the Statute of Autonomy of 
Catalonia and the Lisbon Treaty of 2007. This is why the regulations on the normative 
development of the provisions of the Treaty refer to the participation of the Parliament of 
Catalonia via the Cortes Generales and, in particular, via the Joint Committee. The 
procedure is only regulated to substantiate consultations relating to the compliance of a 
legislative draft of the European Union with the principle of subsidiarity, with the issuance, 
if applicable, of a reasoned opinion of the parliamentary committee within the brief period 
of four weeksXIV. 
Once the subsidiarity sheet is received by the Committee, Parliament’s legal services 
draw up a preliminary note which incorporates the following elements: the subject-matter 
and contents of the proposal, the rationale on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity, and 
the possible impact on autonomous competences (Palomares Amat, 2011: 15).The note 
concludes with a recommendation to the competent sectoral committee to substantiate the 
consultation and a consideration of the degree of compliance of the draft legislative act 
with the principle of subsidiarity. 
The Bureau of the Parliament orders the publication of this note, and once the Board 
of Spokespersons has been heard, the note is sent to the committee competent for the 
matter. This has caused difficulties on certain occasions, either due to the transversal nature 
of many legislative drafts of the European Union or due to the non-alignment of the 
material scopes of drafts with the distribution of work between parliamentary committees. 
The specific legislative committees of the Parliament are established at the start of each 
legislature and their material scope largely coincides with the basic distribution of 
government departments. However, even though the Regulations of the Parliament of 
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Catalonia stipulate that the competent body for substantiating the early warning system is 
the corresponding sectoral committee, in practice the Committee for External Affairs, 
European Union and Cooperation monitors all the consultations. This solution leads to the 
insertion of EU affairs into the everyday work of the committeesXV. Once the competent 
committee has been designated, the Bureau of the Parliament launches a period for 
parliamentary groups to submit observations, and once this period has terminated, the 
Committee drafts an opinion. Depending on both the matter in question and the proposal 
of the competent committee, the Bureau, in agreement with the Board of Spokespersons, 
may then agree that the opinion be approved by the Plenary Session, although to date all 
opinions have been substantiated in the Committee only. 
The Catalan Parliament, until the end of the 8thLegislature (2006-2010), issued reasoned 
opinions during each consultation. However, in the second phase of the 9th Legislature 
(2010-2012) and during the present one there were consultations which ended in a simple 
acknowledgement of receipt. All the resolutions issued considered that the proposed future 
EU rule would not infringe upon the principle of subsidiarity. But there is a difference 
between the previous legislature – when each consultation was answered with a report – 
and the current one, which admits the possibility of concluding the consultation procedure 
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La Rioja Presidency 
Resolution 
Sectoral Committee Specialities Yes, in all cases No provision 
Asturias Resolution Sectoral Committee 
(Permanent Early Warning 
Board) 
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The early warning system of the Lisbon Treaty signifies yet another step forward in the 
progressive involvement of regional actors in the process of European construction. 
Moreover, by increasing the number of actors incorporated into the political dialogue in 
the drafting of EU regulations, it heightens their legitimacy. But we also have to point out 
that it does so in a manner that is complex and difficult to articulate and, in the Spanish 
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case but also in others, in a manner that is not binding for regional parliaments. 
Consequently, in practice the early warning system has become more a mechanism for 
informing the autonomous parliaments of the EU legislative drafts in process than an 
instrument of truly political participation in these projects. With reference to the Spanish 
case–where, in addition to all this, there is no chamber of purely autonomous territorial 
representation – the voice of the Autonomous Communities –or, more precisely, of the 
autonomous parliamentary chambers– is diluted in a procedure monopolised by the Joint 
Committee, which has practically all the decision-making power.  
The early warning procedure focuses on legislative acts, but many Commission 
initiatives begin already before, by way of working and action plans from which future 
initiatives may emerge. Consequently, an essential condition for the parliamentary 
participation mechanism to be effective is the existence of a direct and automatic flow of 
information between European Union institutions and the parliaments of the Member 
States, where governments must be prominently involved. This would allow parliaments to 
participate in better conditions and be more prepared for the legislative phase.  
The regional phase of the mechanism established in the 2009 Act has seen different 
regional developments with regard to parliamentary procedures. They manifest the absence 
of a homogeneous criterion for determining the participation of regional parliaments in the 
scrutiny of subsidiarity, although all regulations allude to the brevity of the four-week 
period during which regional parliaments have to reply to the consultation. In contrast to 
the decision by other regional parliaments to entrust the drafting of an opinion to their 
specific foreign affairs committees, the Catalan Parliament –like others –has delegated this 
task to the materially competent sectoral committee. This decision is based on the thematic 
specialisation of the members of each committee, but in view of the transversal nature of 
many legislative drafts of the Union, the Catalan Parliament has nevertheless opted to 
activate a kind of permanent monitoring by the Committee for External Affairs, European 
Union and Cooperation. 
The practice followed by the regional parliaments demonstrates that in the face of the 
great number of proposals that are arriving and the eminently technical nature of the 
process, it is necessary to articulate some type of filter in order for the autonomous 
parliaments to be able to give a reply or, if applicable, draft an opinion. As the Spanish 
Parliament’s Joint Committee for the European Union does not perform this function, the 
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filtering process must be performed by the regional parliaments themselves, but on the 
basis of political, and not technical, criteria and in relation to the possible impact on 
autonomous competences and the possible political interest that the respective government 
may have. In this way, if the function of the Joint Committee is to automatically forward an 
EU legislative initiative, the default action of an autonomous legislative assembly must be 
the opposite, i.e. to refuse scrutinising initiatives which do not fall within its own scope of 
competences. 
It would be advisable, in this respect, for a specialised parliamentary body to examine 
legislative initiatives of the European Union in a regular and systematic manner and 
consequently to select only matters of special interest, whether at State or Autonomous 
Community level. This could be done by the Parliamentary Bureau or the spokespersons of 
the Joint Committee for the European Union, in the case of the Cortes Generales, or by 
the Committee for External Affairs, European Union and Cooperation, in the case of the 
Parliament of Catalonia. Likewise, cooperation mechanisms should be introduced with the 
respective regional governments to exchange important information more efficiently 
between the executive and parliamentary spheres.  
Finally, and with regard to the legal effects of opinions of regional parliaments with 
legislative powers, we believe that, if it is considered that exclusive competences are 
affected, their opinions must be taken in to consideration by the Joint Committee and have 
to be included in the final reasoned opinion which it sends to the European institutions. 
That is to say that the reasoned opinion of a regional parliament is only justified when an 
infringement upon the principle of subsidiarity is detected that impacts on the 
competences of the respective Autonomous Community. Legal logic would demand that in 
these cases regional opinions be taken into consideration by the Joint Committee and 
included in the reasoned final opinion which it sends to the European institutions. 
Therefore, if the Joint Committee considers that the principle of subsidiarity is not 
affected, it should justify why it is diverging from the view established in the opinion of 
one or several regional parliaments. 
According to the European Commission’s assessment, the early warning mechanism is 
operating well, but it requires very careful preparation to guarantee that it performs its 
function. However, in spite of the Commission’s undeniable commitment to the 
procedure, some regional parliaments consider that their intervention, only provided for 
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after the sending of the draft by the Commission, is very limited, inappropriate, late, barely 
effective, and severely hampered by the application of excessively short time periods. 
 
                                                 
 Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Barcelona. This work forms part of the activities of the 
research project on ‘Multilevel democracy: the participation of citizens and territorial bodies in public 
decision-making processes’ (MEC, DER2012-37567). 
I However, the Commission itself recognises the difficulties of complying with the period and has admitted 
that, in practice, 80% of the reasoned opinions of national parliaments are passed between 8 and 10 weeks. 
For this reason, the Commission considers that the requirement of complying with the period must be 
treated with a certain flexibility, and thus, for example, other possible and less formal exchanges of opinion 
between national parliaments and this EU institution can be contemplated, along with reasoned opinions. 
II Report published in the BOCG [Official Journal of the Spanish Parliament] of 4 January 2008, series A, nº 
474.  
III 9th Legislature (2008-2011). BOCG of 16 April 2009, Series A, nº 127. 
IV Since Spain’s entry into what were then the European Communities, the participation of its Parliament in 
the European sphere has been channelled by way of the Joint Committee, created by the 1994 Act, as a body 
specialising in European matters and composed of members of both parliamentary chambers. 
V Thus, for example, the Netherlands decided to create an ad hoc Joint Committee to apply the early warning 
system. 
VI The purpose of this Act, as is expressed in the exposition of its rationale, was to ensure that Parliament had 
access to all the drafts of legislative acts prepared by the European Commission and to establish the 
Government’s obligations: the reports which it must refer and the periods for sending them, and appearances 
before parliamentary bodies. In this way, the powers of the Committee are enlarged: Ministers, high officials 
of the administration and experts can be required to appear; and study and working groups can be constituted 
to deliberate on specific matters related with the European Union and the Government’s EU policy, with the 
drafting of a subsequent report. Another function is the maintenance of relations with counterpart 
committees of other Member States of the European Union, especially within the COSAC. 
VII The report submitted by the Working Group on 27 November 2007 recommended the creation within the 
Joint Committee for the European Union of a Permanent Sub-Committee in charge of applying the principle 
of subsidiarity, with rules of composition and operation which in the end were not accepted or incorporated 
into the Resolution. 
VIII Published in the BOCG of 16 April 2009, Series A, nº 127. 
IX This precept was challenged in the unconstitutionality appeal lodged against the Statute. In Legal Ground 
122 of Constitutional Court Ruling nº 31/2010 of 28 June, it is reasoned that there can be no trace of 
unconstitutionality when the title precept of the chapter dedicated to relations with the European Union 
(Chapter II of Title V) states that matters related with the Union which affect the powers or interests of 
Catalonia must be conducted in the terms laid down by the State legislation. 
X In fact, a new type of acts publishable in the Official Journals has been added, namely acts concluded with a 
mere acknowledgement of receipt.  
XI Presidency resolutions are a type of rules that are passed either by Committee of the Parliament or its 
Presidency, according to the specific regulatory provision, in the event of loopholes or doubts concerning the 
interpretation of Parliamentary Regulations themselves, but having the same rank or normative value as a 
Parliamentary Regulation.  
XII The participation of the regional and local dimension in the Subsidiarity Monitoring Network of the CoR 
can be articulated in their capacity as regional parliaments (Basque Country, Asturias, Catalonia, Galicia and 
Navarre); as regional governments or executives (Canary Islands, Basque Country, Galicia, Madrid, Valencian 
Community, Murcia and Asturias); local authorities without legislative power (Barcelona Provincial Council, 
autonomous city of Ceuta and the city of Madrid); and other associations such as the Association of 
Municipalities of Aragon or the Federation of Municipalities and Provinces of Extremadura. 
XIII Indeed, the first negative opinion of the Parliament was given because the European Commission had not 
followed its legislative proposal for the mandatory “subsidiarity sheet”. 
XIV In autumn 2009, shortly before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, the Catalan Parliament participated 
in a pilot consultation with the Cortes Generales. This pilot experience was to be governed by criteria 
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approved by the Joint Committee for the European Union, published in the Official Journal of the Cortes 
Generales (Cortes Generales Section, Series A, nº 127, of 16 April 2009). Under the terms of the second aspect 
of the mentioned criteria, “any Parliaments of Autonomous Communities which wish to participate in this pilot experience, 
should they deem it convenient, may forward to the Joint Committee … observations on the degree of compliance with the principle 
of subsidiarity for the initiative in question. The observations received shall be forwarded to the members of the Joint Committee 
for the European Union. In order to be taken into consideration, they must be received within a maximum period of four weeks 
from when they were sent.” During the pilot test, the autonomous parliaments were able not only to report on the 
possible impact on the principle of subsidiarity but also to formulate all the recommendations and 
observations they might consider pertinent due to the nature of the matter. This singularity is no longer 
possible. 
XV The Committee for External Affairs, European Union and Cooperation is a monitoring committee of 
non-legislative nature. Its mission is the specific scrutiny of certain actions and policies of the Government 
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